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Abstract
In this article we look at how one speciﬁc form of temporary employment - employ-
ment with ﬁxed-term contracts - ﬁts into employers’ hiring policies. We ﬁnd that human
capital variables, measured at the levels of the worker and the workplace, are important
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In nearly all labor markets, deregulation was the policy response to high and per-
sistent unemployment. In Europe, many countries adopted two-tier reforms that,
although they increased ﬂexibility at the margin, left unchanged the mandates
applying to already existing contracts. As a result, new contractual arrangements
governed by less stringent rules, particularly with regard to ﬁring costs, were in-
troduced and they rapidly gained importance. In the U.S.A., where no similar
rigidities could be found, it was also the case that new forms of work developed.
Rationalization of the growing share of these work arrangements has been of-
fered within a labor adjustment cost framework. In this context, ﬁrms hire con-
tingent workers because they want to save on future dismissal costs, regardless of
their origin. Notwithstanding, the focus on adjustment costs alone may be too
narrow. Some studies dispute the common view that ﬁxed-term contracts actu-
ally oﬀer ﬁrms increased ﬂexibility due to restrictions that typically apply to the
rolling over of these contracts (Hunt, 2000; Maurin, 2000). In the same vein, a
number of reasons for using ﬁxed-term contracts, other than saving on prospective
ﬁring costs, have been considered. These are mainly cost saving reasons (especially
savings on fringe beneﬁts), temporary replacement, and screening for permanent
positions.
Nevertheless, using ﬁxed-term contracts to ﬁll permanent positions may be
part of the ﬁrm’s personnel policy. Churning (worker turnover in excess of job
turnover), has been earlier reported as a permanent feature of some ﬁrms’ em-
ployment records, and not simply the inevitable response to unfortunate matches
(Burgess et al., 2000). Such policies may be rationalized within an eﬃciency wage
framework, where ﬁrms are thought of as choosing diﬀerent combinations of wage
rates and worker turnover at continuing positions. Firms choose one type of strat-
egy over the other depending on the fundamentals of their technology, skills, and
cost structure. Costly monitoring and training are likely to be associated with
a high wage - low turnover strategy, as are higher average skill level and more
1eﬃcient hiring technologies (Lane et al., 1996).
However, churning strategies may also be rationalized within a simple labor
adjustment cost framework. Because the cost of ﬁring one worker with a temporary
contract is reduced, ﬁrms may be more willing to hire new workers and examine
them on the job. But due to the presence of non-renewal clauses, ﬁrms may prefer
to ﬁre the worker while his contract is temporary and take a chance on a new
one (Blanchard and Landier, 2002). The result is persistent match destruction at
continuing positions, i.e., churning.
It is mainly the possibility that employers use ﬁxed-term contracts for churning
that raises policy concerns. In fact, the implications of ﬁxed-term contracts for
long-term productivity growth depend crucially upon the reasons why employers
use them.
If ﬁxed-term contracts are used as buﬀer stocks, implications are mixed. Flexi-
ble contracts facilitate ﬁring in downturns, reducing labor hoarding and fostering
productivity. However, because they reduce job stability, the use of ﬁxed-term
contracts as buﬀer stocks also hinders match-speciﬁc learning-by-doing and invest-
ments in training, thereby harming long-run growth prospects. On the contrary,
if ﬁxed-term contracts are used as screening devices, they generate better growth
prospects due to better learning about match quality, which translates into better
job matches and, therefore, more stable employer-employeerelationships (Nagyp´ al,
2001).1 However, if ﬁxed-term contracts are used for churning workers, they un-
equivocally have adverse eﬀects in terms of productivity growth, again because
they reduce match-speciﬁc learning-by-doing and investments in training, and be-
cause otherwise good matches are more often terminated and replaced with new
ones of an uncertain value (Blanchard and Landier, 2002).
Assessing the role that ﬁxed-term contracts play in employers’staﬃng policiesis
essentially an empirical problem for which only limited evidence is available. Dis-
entangling the alternative uses of temporary contracts has proven a diﬃcult task.
1Furthermore, Faccini (2007) shows that a matching model where ﬁrms use temporary contracts to screen
workers for permanent positions accounts for the positive correlation between temporary contracts and the em-
ployment rate.
2The standard approach to the problem is to focus on transitions from temporary
to permanent contracts. The implicit assumption is that if temporary contracts
are used as screening devices, transitions to permanent positions will be more
frequent than is the case when those contracts are used for alternative purposes
such as buﬀer stocks or churning. However, lower ﬁring costs bias the employer’s
choice towards less pre-hiring and more on-the-job screening. The result is that
the rate of sucessful matches is now reduced, i.e., transitions to permanent po-
sitions less frequent. Hence, the identiﬁcation of the reasons why employers use
these contracts is somewhat blured.
In this article we take a diﬀerent approach to the same problem. We pose four
questions to which we oﬀer clear evidence obtained from one longitudinal matched
employer-employee dataset. These questions are: (i) which employers use tem-
porary contracts?; (ii) which employees are hired with temporary contracts?; (iii)
which employers convert temporary contracts to permanent?; (iv) which employees
get promoted from temporary to permanent positions? By looking simultaneously
at the employer and the employee sides and at the hiring and promotion stages,
we will be able to produce evidence that answers these four questions and sheds
light on how and why employers use ﬁxed-term contracts. Our interest is in how
human capital intensity, in terms of the skill-structure of the workforce and ﬁrm-
provided training, shapes the employer decision vis-` a-vis temporary contracts.
Direct evidence on vacancies and replacement hires will also be considered. From
the employee-side, educational attainment and labor market experience are the
main focus of our attention. The timing of contract conversion is also of interest.
We also depart from previous studies of the same issue by using a diﬀerent
type of data. Whereas previous studies use employee data obtained from domestic
Labor Force Surveys, we use matched employer-employee data. Our data is for
Portugal.
Fixed-term contracts represent a non-trivial share of total employment in the
Portuguese labor market (17.6 percent, on average, for the period between1995 and
2003). In 2003, Portugal exhibited the second largest share of ﬁxed-term contracts
3in total employment within the 15 EU member States where ﬁxed-term contracts
accounted for an average of 12.8 percent of total employment (Portugal, with 20.6
percent in the same year, was second only to Spain, which exhibited a record mark
of 30.6 percent - European Commission, 2004). Quarterly data available for the
period between 1991 and 1998 indicate that ﬁxed-term contracts account for an
average of 62 percent of all accessions and 43 percent of all separations in the
Portuguese labor market (source: Employer Employment Survey).
The Portuguese case is of interest not only on quantitative grounds but also
because it is a case where strict overall employment protection legislation is ac-
companied by relatively mild regulation of temporary forms of employment.2 This
is, in fact, weaker in Portugal than in other European countries with strict pro-
tection rules against individual dismissal, such as France, Spain or Greece. This
is to some extent speciﬁc to the Portuguese case, as high-EPL countries typically
have strict regulation on temporary forms of employment.3
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical strategy.
Data are described in Section 3. Results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2 Estimation strategy
2.1 The beta-binomial regression model
To address the two questions on the employer side - which employersuse temporary
contracts and which employers convert temporary contracts to permanent? - we
use fractional regression models.
The ﬁrst model focuses on the employer’s decision to oﬀer a ﬁxed-term contract
as an alternative to standard (open-ended) contracts. The dependent variable is
2On the conspicuous nature of the Portuguese labor market, see Blanchard and Portugal (2001) and Varej˜ ao
and Portugal (2007).
3The strictness of the overall EPL legislation is especially due to the protection of permanent workers against
individual dismissal. As a result, Portugal occupies the ﬁrst position (alongside Turkey) in the OECD ranking
of the most stringent employment protection legislation in Europe, although it occupies an intermediate position
if we only consider the regulation of temporary employment (OECD, 1999 and 2004). Legislation on dismissals
and ﬁxed-term contracts did not change signiﬁcantly over the period covered by our analysis (1995-2003). With
minor amendments, the law on ﬁxed-term contracts dates back to 1989 and the law on dismissals to 1991. They
were both in place until 2004, when a new labor law was adopted.
4the number of ﬁxed-term contracts existing at the ﬁrm at a certain point in time
(the number of events) out of the total number of employees at the ﬁrm (the
number of trials). In cases like this, a count model applied to proportions (of
which the Poisson regression model is the most commonly assumed) is often used.
The same kind of speciﬁcation would also be indicated for the second regression
model where the dependent variable is the number of ﬁxed-term contracts that
were converted to open-ended (the number of events) out of the total of ﬁxed-term
contracts existing at the ﬁrm (the number of trials).
However, if data display overdispersion, the Poisson assumption will fail and
generalized count models generated by mixtures of distributions are more ade-
quate. Unobserved heterogeneity or true contagion, may both generate overdis-
persed data, which is, in fact, a common feature of count data. One way that
overdispersion may manifest itself is through a higher relative frequency of zero
observations than is consistent with the Poisson assumption.4
In these circumstances, the count data models more commonly used in applied
work are negative binomial models that may be interpreted as a Poisson-gamma
mixture, i.e., a Poisson distribution with unobserved individual (gamma) hetero-
geneity that also allows for particular forms of dependence for the underlying
stochastic process (true contagion). The problem with the negative binomial spec-
iﬁcation is that it assumes an inﬁnite upper bound for the variable of interest,
which makes it inappropriate whenever that upper bound is small, as is the case
with the dependent variables of the two regression models being estimated.
In these cases, a beta-binomial model is a useful alternative (Heckman and
Willis, 1977). This model assumes that the probability p that the event occurs
in any of its n trials depends on a set of unobserved individual characteristics
and that this is distributed as a beta random variable with parameters α and θ.
Under these assumptions, the dependent count variable Y follows a beta-binomial
distribution.5
4Hurdle models are sometimes used to deal with this feature of the data that is commonly referred to as ‘excess
zeros’ or ‘zero inﬂation’.
5For a thoughtful presentation of the beta-binomial regression model, see Santos Silva and Murteira (2000).
We thank Santos Silva for kindly providing us with the TSP codes for the beta-binomial model.
5This beta-binomial regression model stands for the binomial very much in the
same way as the negative binomial model stands for the Poisson. This means
that it may still be interpreted as a binomial distribution with individual hetero-
geneity, but also as giving the number of successes when both success and failure
are contagious.6 The accommodation of true contagion is a welcome feature of
this distribution because the dependent variables in the two previously described
models may display that property. In fact, if a ﬁrm uses ﬁxed-term contracts as a
structural component of its staﬃng policy, the occurrence of an event increases the
probability of further occurrences, and conversely. Likewise, in the second model,
if ﬁrms use ﬁxed-term contracts as part of a strategy of churning workers around
a ﬁxed number of positions, failure to convert one contract to a permanent one
raises the probability of further failures (Johnson et al., 2005).
2.2 The complementary log-log hazard model
To address the two questions on the employee side - which employees are hired
with temporary contracts and which employees get promoted from temporary to
permanent positions? - we use a binary choice model and a hazard regression
model.
Duration analysis provides a convenient statistical framework to study labor
market transitions. In such a context, the duration variable measures the worker’s
tenure on the job. In studies of transitions out of temporary employment, the cor-
responding duration deﬁnition is time since admission with a ﬁxed-term contract
(i.e., the tenure on the job of the temporary worker). In our data, duration is
measured at discrete intervals (quarters). We thus consider a simple discrete time
duration model: the complementary log-log (cloglog) model.
Considering the workers’ alternatives, we shall also distinguish between three
exit modes from the current temporary employment spell: same employer - open-
ended contract, employed with a diﬀerent employer, out of the dataset (unem-
6The estimation procedureautomaticallyweighs each observationby the correspondingrisk set. That is, in the
incidence of ﬁxed-term contracts equation, the observations are (implicitly) weighted by the number of employees;
in the transition to permanent employment equation the observations are weigthed by the number of workers with
ﬁxed-term contracts.
6ployed, civil servant, independent work status or out of the labor force). Thus, we
deﬁne cause-speciﬁc hazard functions to destination j.
The model has a conventional competing risks interpretation. In this frame-
work, a latent duration (Tj) attaches to each exit mode. We only observe the
minimum of each latent variable. If risks are assumed to be independent, with
continuous duration, this model simpliﬁes to three separate single-cause hazard
models. The same simpliﬁcation can be obtained if we assume that transitions
can occur only at the limits of the intervals, which, for the sake of simplicity, we
will do.
3 Data
In the empirical work we use data from two diﬀerent sources. The ﬁrst is a longi-
tudinal ﬁrm-level dataset and the second is a matched employer-employee dataset.
Both datasets are administrative in nature and are administrated by the Por-
tuguese Ministry of Labor. They are mergeable and at some point we make use of
this possibility.
3.1 The longitudinal employer data
The Social Audit (‘Balan¸ co Social’) is an annual survey run by the Portuguese
Ministry of Employment. When it was ﬁrst introduced in 1986 it covered state-
owned ﬁrms only. Since then, its coverage has expanded, ﬁrst to ﬁrms with at
least 500 employees and, since 1992, to all ﬁrms with at least 100 employees. For
these ﬁrms, answering the survey is mandatory.
Each year, a respondent ﬁrm reports data on a large variety of topics concerning
the characteristicsof the workforce and labor costs. This isorganized into six major
areas: (i) company details; (ii) employment; (iii) labor costs; (iv) occupational
safety; (v) vocational training; and (vi) social expenditures.
The employment block, which is the largest component of the survey, collects
detailed information on the characteristics of the ﬁrm’s workforce, namely the total
number of workers (year average and end-of-year count), the skill composition, age
7structure, tenure, and the educational level of the workforce. Total employment
is also broken down by type of contract. Extensive information on the stock
and ﬂows of workers with ﬁxed-term contracts is also available. Reasons why
permanent workers left the ﬁrm during the course of each calendar year are also
reported. The bulk of data used here comes from this block. Other variables refer
to wages (wage level and wage dispersion) and costs of vocational training.
Eight waves of the survey were available for this study, covering the period
from 1995 to 2002. The dataset we used contains information on an average of
2,100 ﬁrms (a total of 16,789 year × ﬁrm observations) and approximately 787,000
workers per year. The number of workers represented in the dataset corresponds
to 36 percent of the total number of employees in the Portuguese labor force
(excluding civil servants).
The Social Audit enables us to identify the ﬁrm-level share of ﬁxed-term con-
tracts in total employment and the proportion of ﬁxed-term contracts that were
converted to permanent during the calendar year.
The stock measure of ﬁxed-term contracts was obtained using the total number
of such contracts reported by respondents, which refers to the year-end (head count
by December 31st).7
However, using the year-end count of ﬁxed-term contracts to compute the cor-
responding rate of conversion would be inappropriate. Hence, the total numbers of
such contracts that existed during the calendar year and that became permanent
during the same period were used.
The sole measure of wages reported is the ﬁrm-level average for its entire work-
force excluding top-level managers. This (unconditional) wage variable simply
tells us whether ﬁrms are high or low-wage ﬁrms, giving us no information on the
relative wage of temporary and permanent workers.
7For consistency, we use the correspondingcount of the total number of employees, instead of the year average,
which is also reported.
83.2 Matched employer-employee data
The Personnel Records (‘Quadros de Pessoal’) dataset is a matched employer-
employee dataset (Personnel Records) that contains information on every wage-
earner in the Portuguese economy (with the exception of civil servants and inde-
pendent workers) as well as on their employers (ﬁrm-level and establishment-level).
These data have been collected since 1985 but it was not until 2002 that infor-
mation on each worker’s type of contract was collected. We restrict our use of
these data to their 2002 and 2003 waves, so that we have one year overlap with
the Social Audit, thereby keeping the option of merging the two datasets.
From the Personnel Records data we produce two diﬀerent datasets.
3.2.1 New-hires dataset
The new-hires dataset is a subset of the raw 2003 ﬁle that contains only the
observations corresponding to individuals with tenure less than or equal to three
months (i.e., who have been hired by their current employer at some point between
July and October 2003).8 The sample is further restricted to those employees that
work for a ﬁrm that is also a respondent to the Social Audit. The original ﬁle
contains 2,855,599 observations and the restricted ﬁle 26,748 observations. We
observe the age, gender, education and nationality of all these new hires.
3.2.2 Fixed-term contract dataset
The ﬁxed-term contracts dataset is constructed to look at transitions out of tem-
porary employment. Starting with the 2002 ﬁle (with a total of 2,693,960 ob-
servations) the sample is restricted to those workers (469,940) that are employed
with a ﬁxed-term contract and were hired by their current employer at some point
between October 1999 and October 2002 (i.e., those whose contract has not yet
reached its legal maximum length - 36 months - in 2003). The number of these
workers that work for ﬁrms that are also respondents to the Social Audit (with at
least 100 employees) is 148,764. The worker characteristics as of 2002 are thus ob-
8Data from Quadros de Pessoal are refer to the month of October of the corresponding year.
9tained. The characteristics of the worker’s employer are also taken from 2002 data,
Personnel Records or Social Audit. From the 2002 ﬁle of the Personnel Records
dataset we obtain the ﬁrms’ average monthly wage of permanent workers in 2002
as well as the average pay for an overtime hour of work.
By merging the 2002 and 2003 Personnel Records dataﬁles we are able to iden-
tify the situation of all the workers that in the ﬁrst year had a ﬁxed-term contract.
Four distinct outcomes are considered: i. employed with the same employer and
with an open-ended contract; ii. employed with the same employer and still with a
ﬁxed-term contract; iii. employed with a diﬀerent employer; iv. missing (employed
in the Public Administration, working as an independent worker, unemployed or
out of the labor force). After excluding all ﬁrms without ﬁxed-term contract em-
ployees and all observations with missing values for any of the regressors, the ﬁnal
dataset contains 80,840 observations.
4 Results
4.1 The hiring stage
Who hires temporary workers?
In this section we report the results of the estimation of the ﬁrst beta-binomial
regression model. The dependent variable (Y ) is the number of workers at the
ﬁrm that have a ﬁxed-term contract and the size of the risk set (n) corresponds
to the total number of employees at the same ﬁrm, which is also an upper bound
on the number of ﬁxed-term contracts that the ﬁrm may oﬀer at any time.9 The
vector x is a set of variables that account for the characteristics of the ﬁrm and
its workforce. The estimation results are provided in Table 1.
9It could be arguedthat some workers were hired prior to the introductionof ﬁxed-termcontractsand therefore
could not have been oﬀered such contracts. However, because ﬁxed-term contracts were introducedin Portugal as
early as 1978 and a cap on their duration always existed (and never execeeded three years over the sample period)
it is adequate to assume that the inability to use ﬁxed-term contracts some twenty years prior to the period we
study is irrelevant to the problem we are addressing. We are assuming that all workers could have a ﬁxed-term
contract if the ﬁrm dismissed all workers with permanent contracts and hired replacement workers.
10parameter estimate std. error marg. eﬀect
Skill-composition (%)
Managers -4.190* 0.642 -2.733
Top executives -1.473* 0.178 -0.961
Intermediate executives -2.273* 0.159 -1.483
Supervisors and team leaders -0.975* 0.186 -0.636
Highly skilled professionals -1.222* 0.133 -0.797
Skilled professionals -0.616* 0.131 -0.401
Semi-skilled professionals -0.068 0.139 -0.044
Firm size (nr. of workers)
500-999 0.042 0.035 2.768
1000 and more -0.165* 0.043 -10.299
Firm Age
2 - 5 years -0.230* 0.090 -14.044
5 and more -0.287* 0.086 -17.232
age unknown -1.369* 0.351 -58.434
Wage dispersion (t-1) 0.092** 0.004 0.060
Wage dispersion unknown 0.133* 0.027 9.008
Training costs per worker (log) -0.016* 0.005 -0.875
Age structure of the workforce
% between 25 and 44 -3.039* 0.118 -1.982
% between 45 and 64 -4.592* 0.102 -2.995
% 65 and over -0.970 0.794 -0.633
Voluntary quits (%) 0.261* 0.071 0.170
Separations due to demographics (%) 1.113*** 0.645 0.726
Hours worked (%) 0.559* 0.113 0.365







Table 1: Determinants of the Use of Fixed-Term Contracts - Beta-binomial Re-
gression Model. *, **, *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively .
The ﬁrst set of variables we want to consider are those that proxy for human
capital intensity. These variables are the proportion of workers classiﬁed in each
skill-level and training costs per worker (in logs). Eight skill-levels were consid-
ered.10 The reference category is that of Apprentices.
The results indicate that human capital intensity and ﬁxed-term contracts move
10All workersare administrativelyassignedone skill-levelout of eightpossibilitieson the basis of their occupation
and level of education. The eight skill-levels are: top executives, intermediate executives, supervisors and team
leaders, highly-skilled professionals, skilled professionals, semi-skilled professionals, non-skilled professionals, and
apprentices, interns and trainees.
11in opposite directions. Firms with a larger share of workers near the top-end of
the skills distribution are less likely to use temporary contracts. Increasing by one
percentage point the share of Top Cadre employees reduces by 2.7 the number of
temporary contracts at the ﬁrm (i.e. by 3.9 percent of the average count).11
As we have discussed previously, the choice of the contract the ﬁrm oﬀers when
hiring new employeescrucially depends on its hiring technology. Firms may choose
between high and low hiring cost strategies, which will produce diﬀerent results
in terms of the quality of the matches being formed (greater if more pre-hiring
screening is done). The choice of the hiring technology will depend on the costs of
failure, which will depend on the cost of keepingthe wrong match on the job and on
the type of contract oﬀered to newly admitted workers. The cost of failure increases
as we move up in ﬁrms’ hierarchy of positions, a fact well-known in the span-of-
control literature (Rosen, 1982). This implies that workers hired to ﬁll higher-
rank positions (typically, more skilled workers) are likely to pass through a more
demanding screening process aimed at minimizing the risk of failure. Still, if bad
matches are formed, they will be quickly undone because the cost of keeping the
match is more likely to exceed the cost of dismissal. Termination of new contracts
within a short time means that it occurs within the trial period when the ﬁring
cost advantage of ﬁxed-term contracts is minimum.12 The two arguments imply
that highly skilled workers are more likely to be hired on open-ended contracts.
However, even if they are hired with a ﬁxed-term contract, the promotion decision
is expected within a short time. In any case, ﬁrms with a more skilledworkforce are
expected to have a smaller fraction of ﬁxed-term contracts because they oﬀer open-
ended contracts to their newly-admitted workers more frequently and because they
make the decision to terminate the temporary match or convert it to permanent
sooner rather than later. This is, indeed, what our estimation results indicate.
Human capital intensity is likely to inﬂuence the employer’s choice between
11All marginal eﬀects were computed for the mean value of all continuous variables in the regressors set and
for the omitted category of all dummy variables. The estimated count at the mean is 68.6 for an average risk set
of 374.2, corresponding to an estimated proportion of ﬁxed-term contracts of 18.3 percent.
12Since 1991, the length of the trial period for workers hired with open-ended contracts varies with the com-
plexity and responsibility of the tasks being performed. For top executives it is four times as long as it is for
unskilled or semi-skilled workers; for highly skilled workers it is three times as long.
12temporary and open-ended contracts for two other reasons. First, more skilled
workers receive higher wages. To the extent that ﬁring costs have a component
that varies with the worker’s wage, as they typically do, this will imply that
ﬁring costs are increase with the worker’s skill. In such circumstances, low-ﬁring
cost contracts are specially valued and employers should prefer hiring their skilled
workers with temporary contracts. However, higher human capital intensity also
implies more stable employment relations, because ﬁring a skilled worker implies
the loss of all shared investments (training included). The more skilled workers
are, the more likely it is that the latter component of the ﬁring cost dominates the
former. Hence, we expect that ﬁrms that employ skilled workers more intensively
will also employ a smaller fraction of their employees with temporary contracts.
A variable measuring training costs per worker (in logs) was also included in
the regressors set. It is computed as the ratio between the ﬁrm’s total expenditure
on training and the ﬁrm’s total number of workers. We would like to include in the
regression the amount of training given to newly-hired and tenured workers, but
separately. Unfortunately, we do not have information on the type of training ﬁrms
pay for. Therefore, all we can establish at this point is that ﬁrms that invest more
in training also employ fewer workers with ﬁxed-term contracts - a one percent
increase in training expenditures per capita reduces the ﬁxed-term contract count
by 0.875. Standard human capital theory implies that training intensive ﬁrms
will hire their employees on permanent contracts or on temporary contracts that
are rapidly terminated or transformed into permanent. However, if training is
an ability screen, as in Author (2001), its relationship with temporary forms of
employment is totally reversed. In this case, employers adopt less intensive pre-
hiring screening strategies and screen bad matches out as their newly-admitted
workers go through on-the-job training programmes. In this case, more training
implies a greater use of ﬁxed-term contracts. However, a positive association
between training and ﬁxed-term contract use would also be consistent with training
intensive ﬁrms using a fringe of temporary workers to insulate their permanent and
highly trained workers from the alias of economic conditions. Hence, the result
13we obtain, although consistent with an human capital interpretation, does not
preclude the possibility of ﬁxed-term contracts being used to screen workers for
permanent positions.
The two sets of results above indicate that the more skilled the ﬁrm’s workforce
is the less it will use ﬁxed-term contracts. Still, we cannot tell whether this is
because human capital intensive ﬁrms do not use temporary contracts to screen
workers to permanent positions, regardless of the skill content of those positions,
or because they simply hire fewer low-skilled workers.13 Only by looking at the
ﬂow of new admissions and transitions out of temporary employment (which we
do below) will we be able to sort out the two alternatives.
Direct evidence on the screening role of ﬁxed-term contracts is obtained by
including in the set of regressors two variables that measure the proportion of
permanent workers that leave the ﬁrm either voluntarily or because of ’natural’
causes (old age and death). Both are taken as proxies for the number of permanent
positions opened at the ﬁrm and both coeﬃcients are positive and signiﬁcant.
If ﬁxed-term contracts are used to ﬁll permanent positions, then the number
of permanent vacancies will have a positive eﬀect on both the share of temporary
contracts and the proportion of ﬁxed-term contracts converted into open-ended
contracts. No signiﬁcant relationship should emerge if ﬁxed-term contracts did not
play a screening role. The above-mentioned relationship between open vacancies
and ﬁxed-term contracts is expected to hold only if those vacancies were not opened
because of the ﬁrm’s previous ﬁring decisions. This means that we would like to
exclude separations by mutual consent and early exitsinto retirement. The number
of permanent workers who left the ﬁrm during the calendar year voluntarily as well
as the number of those who left into retirement due to old age and those who died
are reasonably good proxies for the number of permanent positions open at the
ﬁrm level.14
If ﬁxed-term contracts are used to screen workers for permanent positions, we
13Recall that we are controlling for the skill-structure of the stock, not the ﬂow, of workers.
14For the universe of Portuguese ﬁrms with at least 100 employees, the voluntary quit rate of workers with an
open-ended contract is 5.5 percent. Exits into retirement and workers’ deaths account for 8.3 and 1.6 percent,
respectively, of the total number of separations of workers with such contracts.
14expect more separations of permanent workers for these two reasons to imply a
greater number of temporary workers (replacement hires) and a greater rate of
promotion of temporary workers to permanent positions. Our results indicate
that when the proportion of permanent workers that leave for natural causes and
voluntarily increases by one percentage point, the expected number of temporary
contracts at the ﬁrm also rises by 0.726 and 0.170, respectively. This also indicates
that ﬁxed-term contracts are used as mechanisms for screening. However, this
indication may only be conﬁrmed or not when we consider the promotion stage.
The regression equation also contains a number of other covariates that seek
to control for other relevant ﬁrm characteristics - ﬁrm age (younger ﬁrms facing
more volatile environments), wage dispersion (controlling for union strength as
stronger unions are associated with reduced wage dispersion - Freeman, 1982,
Cardoso and Portugal, 2005), the age structure of the workforce, the share of
male workers, the percentage of hours actually worked relative to the maximum
possible considering the number of workers and the maximum length of their work
week (which proxies for temporary variations of the workload), and ﬁrm size.15
The signs of the regression coeﬃcients are in accordance with expectations. In
particular, it is worth noticing that the estimate obtained for the coeﬃcient of the
wage dispersion variable is consistent with unions opposing the use of ‘precarious’
forms of contract for all workers rather than with the alternative (unions aiming
at protecting the employment of their constituency, dominated by core-permanent
workers, at the expense of those newly-arrived on the labor market or re-entering
it).
Who gets a temporary contract?
The evidence reported in the previous section refers to the ﬁrm-level stock of
temporary contracts. In this section we use employee-level data obtained from
the ﬁrst matched employer-employee dataset described in Section 3.2 to look at
15The ﬁrm’s age enters the regression as a qualitative variable with three categories: less than two years
(omitted), between two and ﬁve and more than ﬁve years old. Four intervals were considered for the employees’
age variable: less than 25 (omitted), between 25 and 64 and over 64. Three dummy variables - between 100 and
499 workers (omitted), between 500 and 999 workers, and 1000 workers and more - control for ﬁrm size).
15the ﬂow of new admissions (workers admitted in the three-month period prior
to the observation point). With these data we estimate a Probit model for the
probability that the new match is formed as temporary, i.e., the newly-admitted
worker is oﬀered a ﬁxed-term contract.
To identify the eﬀect of employers’ characteristics on workers’ outcomes we
want to control for worker attributes that are likely to inﬂuence the probability
of working with temporary contracts. We know from a diﬀerent study (Varej˜ ao
and Portugal, 2005) that workers with ﬁxed-term contracts in Portugal are pre-
dominantly female, young (below the age of 35), and that they have low levels
of education. In our empirical model we do not want to control for the workers’
skill, but only for those attributes that are individual-speciﬁc (age, gender and
education).16 Besides, as immigrants are also known to be more likely to work
with temporary contracts (Fern´ andez and Ortega, 2006), we will also control for
nationality status (nationals versus non-nationals).
Standard labor demand theory implies that the choice between hours and em-
ployees hinges on the relative costs of the two margins of adjustment. In particular,
for the same hiring and ﬁring costs of temporary workers, the employer’s choice
will be biased toward adding more (temporary) workers as an alternative to adding
extra hours if the cost of overtime hours is greater (see Gramm and Schnell, 2001).
Therefore, we will include one variable that measures the cost of overtime hours.
We will also control for the wages of permanent workers at the ﬁrm as the higher
these wages are, the greater the employer propensity will be to use the less costly
temporary workers and to keep them as temporaries for as long as possible, or else
have them leave.
Finally, considering our previous discussion of the role that human capital and
training play in the hiring process, we also want to include a measure of training
intensity in order to assess its impact on the hiring policy of the ﬁrm.
In Table 2 we report the results of the estimation of the Probit model for the
probability that a worker is hired as temporary as opposed to permanent.
16Because skill levels are determined by workers’ attributes (education and experience) as well as by their
occupation and tenure, which are job-related, we do not include them in the regressor set.
16estimate std. error mg. eﬀect
Intercept 1.092 0.054
Schooling
6 years 0.312* 0.030 0.058
9 years 0.376* 0.029 0.067
12 years 0.186* 0.030 0.037
College -0.378* 0.036 -0.101
Gender (Male=1) -0.013 0.020 -0.003
Immigrants 0.104* 0.031 0.022
Workers’ Age
20 - 25 0.051 0.044 0.011
25 - 30 -0.079*** 0.044 -0.018
30 - 35 -0.307* 0.045 -0.079
35 - 40 -0.446* 0.047 -0.123
40 - 45 -0.498* 0.049 -0.140
45 - 50 -0.486* 0.052 -0.136
50 - 55 -0.624* 0.058 -0.183
55 - 60 -0.813* 0.071 -0.254
60 and over -0.744* 0.086 -0.228
Training costs per worker (log) 0.018* 0.005 0.004
Firm size (nr. of workers)
500-999 0.183* 0.029 0.037
1000 and more -0.096* 0.022 -0.022
Permanent workers’ monthly wage 0.0001* 0.000 0.0000
Overtime hour cost -0.034* 0.004 -0.008
No overtime ﬁrm -0.165* 0.030 -0.040
N 30,963
Log likelihood -13551.85
Table 2: Probability of being hired with a fixed-term contract - Probit Model.
*, **, *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Age intervals are closed on
the left.
The estimates obtained for the coeﬃcients of the variables that represent em-
ployees’ characteristics are consistent with the well-known proﬁle of temporary
workers. Female workers, immigrants and low-educated workers are all more likely
to be hired on a temporary contract than otherwise similar workers by similar
ﬁrms.
Workers’ age has a decisive eﬀect on the type of contract they are more likely
to be oﬀered. In the probit model we have included a set of nine age dummies
that take the value one if the worker falls into the corresponding age interval (all
brackets, except the last, have a ﬁve-year width starting at the age of 20; the
omitted category is below 20). The probability of receiving a temporary contract
17decreases with the worker’s age for every age interval considered above the age
of 25. Evaluated at the sample average of the continuous regressors and for the
omitted categories of the qualitative variables (including age - below 20), the es-
timated probability of being hired with a ﬁxed-term contract is 86.1 percent (the
sample average is 79.1 percent). However, this probability drops oﬀ substantially
for workers aged at or above 25. It is 55.4 per cent for workers with similar charac-
teristics but aged between 30 and 35, and 23.7 per cent for individuals in the 50-55
age bracket. While this probability remains high for individuals in all age groups,
it is clear that it is at the early stages of participation in the labor market that
ﬁxed-term contracts are more frequently oﬀered and accepted. This is an indica-
tion of these contracts being used for screening workers for permanent positions as
younger workers are less able to convey relevant information to the labor market
and are more likely to be in a job shopping situation. If other reasons - staﬃng for
temporary positions or churning - were to dominate the probability of receiving a
ﬁxed-term contract, we would not expect it to vary across age groups as much as
it does.
The higher the wages paid to permanent employees are and the more resources
the ﬁrm devotes to training its workforce, the more likely it is that ﬁxed-term
contracts will be used for new admissions.
The results also show that the probability of being hired with a ﬁxed-term
contract is reduced by 4.0 percentage points if the hiring ﬁrm did not use overtime
work in the past (the year before the hirings occur). To the extent that overtime
work is the employer’s ﬁrst response to temporary increases in the workload or
increases of an uncertain duration, this is an indication that ﬁrms facing more
stable environments also use permanent contracts more frequently when hiring.
4.2 The promotion stage
Who promotes temporary workers to permanent positions?
In this subsection we look at the rate at which ﬁrms convert ﬁxed-term contracts
18into open-ended contracts. Our aim is to set the proﬁle of those employers who
are more likely to make that decision. To do that, we estimate the second beta-
binomial regression model referred to in Section 2.1. The dependent variable is the
number of workers with ﬁxed-term contracts that obtained an open-ended contract
during the calendar year, the size of the risk set being the total number of ﬁxed-
term contracts that existed at any point in time within the same year, which is
also the upper bound for the number of contract conversions that are feasible in
every period. As before, x is a set of variables that account for the characteristics
of the ﬁrm and the workforce. In addition to the same variables used in the ﬁrst
beta-binomial model, x now also includes one control for the average of the hourly
base wage (in logs) computed at the ﬁrm level, as well as controls for the tenure
structure of the workforce. Results are reported in Table 3.
At the sample mean of the continuous regressors and for the omitted category of
all qualitative regressors, the estimated probability of a ﬁxed-term contract being
converted to permanent is 18.6% (the corresponding sample mean is 18.0%). Con-
trolling for ﬁrms’ size and age, and including year and industry dummies, human
capital intensive ﬁrms are those that promote temporary workers to permanent po-
sitions more often. Increasing by 1 percentage point the proportion of intermediate
executives or supervisors and team leaders at the ﬁrm raises the estimated count
of temporary contracts that become permanent by 0.218 and 0.142, respectively.17
Fixed-term contracts are also more likely to end with a conversion to an open-
ended contract among ﬁrms that invest more in training. The marginal eﬀect is
0.636 more contracts converted for each 1 percent increase in training per worker
(temporary or not). The same positive eﬀect is also obtained for wages even after
controlling for all the relevant ﬁrm and workforce characteristics.
These results are all consistent with ﬁxed-term contracts being used for screen-
ing (and as a complement of training). If anything, they allow for another type of
use of ﬁxed-term contracts (churning or buﬀer-stock) only in the case of low-skill
17Increasing the share of employees at the very top of the skill structure has a smaller eﬀect on contract
conversion than it has at the middle. However, at the top levels - managers and top executives - the proportion
of workers admitted with ﬁxed-term contracts is very small.
19estimate std. error mg. eﬀect
Skill-composition (%)
Managers 0.167 1.064 0.028
Top Executives 0.089 0.277 0.015
Intermediate Executives 1.305* 0.232 0.218
Supervisors and team leaders 0.846* 0.264 0.142
Highly skilled professionals 0.591* 0.171 0.099
Skilled professionals 0.393** 0.164 0.066
Semi-skilled professionals 0.215 0.169 0.036
Firm size (nr. of workers)
500-999 0.099** 0.047 1.699
1000 and more 0.521 0.056 9.603
Firm age
2-5 years -0.039 0.224 -0.648
5 and more years -0.209 0.219 -3.327
age unknown 0.633 0.427 11.851
Wage dispersion (t-1) -0.015* 0.005 -0.266
Wage dispersion unknown -0.196* 0.040 -3.135
Training costs per worker (log) 0.038* 0.007 0.636
Hourly wage (log) 0.107* 0.029 1.797
Tenure structure (%)
2 years or less -0.932* 0.094 -0.156
2-5 years 1.602* 0.136 0.268
Workers’ age structure (%)
25-44 years -0.008 0.176 -0.001
45-64 years -0.402** 0.173 -0.067
65 and over -0.226 1.145 -0.038
Male workers (%) -0.055 0.064 -0.009
Separations due to demographics (%) 2.137 1.263 0.358
Voluntary quits (%) 0.381** 0.179 0.064





Table 3: Determinants of the conversion of Fixed-Term Contracts into Open-
ended Contracts - Beta-binomial Regression Model. *, **, *** denote statistical signiﬁ-
cance at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
jobs/ﬁrms.
The very same indication is implied by the estimates obtained for the tenure
structure. A greater share of workers with tenure between two and ﬁve years
(most ﬁxed-term contracts have a maximum duration of three years) increases
signiﬁcantly the number of ﬁxed-term contracts that are converted into open-
20ended contracts. A one percentage point increase in the proportion of workers
with less than two years of tenure reduces, relative to the omitted category (more
than ﬁve years) the count of contracts transformed into open-ended contracts by
0.156 (slightly more than one percent of the average count, which is 14.9). On the
contrary, a greater proportion of workers with two to ﬁve years of tenure increases
the predicted count (the estimated marginal eﬀect is 0.268).
The number of permanent positions opened due to exits into retirement or to
the death of the worker and, in particular, job openings due to voluntary quits of
workers with permanent contracts, also increase the expected conversion of tem-
porary contracts into open-ended contracts (0.064 more contracts being converted
into open-ended for an additional 1 percentage point of permanent workers leaving
the ﬁrm voluntarily).
Recall that permanent positions that become vacant were also found to have a
positive eﬀect on the number of admissions with ﬁxed-term contracts. Together,
these two results describe the employer’s dominant strategy when they recruit
for a permanent position - typically they oﬀer an initial temporary contract with
the promise of a promotion to an open-ended contract if the match proves good
enough. This is consistent with Nagyp´ al’s (2001) description of the process of
learning about match quality. In conjunction with our results on the eﬀects of
training intensity, this result is also consistent with Autor’s (2001) ﬁnding that
temporary employment is a mechanism of recruitment for permanent positions
and training is an ability screen.
We can also see the importance of the screening role of temporary contracts by
looking at the eﬀect of the Hours Worked variable on both admissions and promo-
tions. This variable measures the proportion of the maximum number of normal
hours that the ﬁrm can obtain from its stock of workers that was actually used.
It is thus an indicator of how distant the ﬁrm is from its production frontier. We
have seen before that the higher the proportion of actual hours is in relation to the
maximum, the more the ﬁrm will hire with ﬁxed-term contracts. This is what we
would expect if the increase in the workload is of an uncertain duration. However,
21here we also see that when these circumstances prevail, ﬁrms are also expected
to promote more temporary workers to permanent positions. Meaning that ﬁxed-
term contracts are used as devices for screening workers for permanent positions
especially when the economic environment they operate in is more uncertain.
Who gets promoted from temporary to permanent positions?
To study transitions out of temporary employment spells, we estimated the
complementary log-log hazard model described in Section 2.2. Three possible exit
modes were considered - promotion to a permanent position without switching
employers, transition to a diﬀerent employer, and exit from dependent employment
in the private sector. The ﬁrst type of transition is the one that contains more
information on the type of use employers make of ﬁxed-term contracts. Hence, the
corresponding results are the only ones that are reported here.
The regressor set contains the same variables as in the probit model in the
previous section. These include both worker characteristics and employer charac-
teristics. Because the probabilities attached to the alternative exit modes may be
determined by the number of ﬁxed-term contracts that exist at the ﬁrm at the
moment the transition is observed, we add a control for this number (the ’ﬁxed-
term contract’ variable). To circumvent the possibility that this variable could
be endogenous, we also included in the equation the estimation residuals of the
beta-binomial model for the stock of ﬁxed-term contracts at the ﬁrm discussed in
Section 4.1 (see Train, 2008).
Schooling and age are two important determinants of the employment prospects
of temporary workers. The probability that a worker will obtain a permanent
contract from his or her employer is 3 to 5 percentage points above the baseline
age category (less than 20) until the age of 35-40. Thereafter, that probability
declines very rapidly. The eﬀect of age becomes negative above the age of 50. It is
especially strong and signiﬁcant for all workers above the age of 60.18 A transition
to an open-ended contract is also more likely for more educated workers - the eﬀect
18In these age intervals, employees are less likely to make a transition to all destinations considered. Put
diﬀerently, these are the workers that face the highest probability of remaining in temporary employment.
22estimate. std. error mg. eﬀect
Gender (Male=1) -0.005 0.018 -0.001
Schooling
6 years 0.013 0.029 0.002
9 years 0.017 0.029 0.002
12 years 0.070** 0.029 0.010
College 0.271* 0.036 0.043
Immigrant Status -0.346* 0.032 -0.045
Workers’ age
20 - 25 0.255* 0.040 0.039
25 - 30 0.354* 0.041 0.056
30 - 35 0.308* 0.043 0.049
35 - 40 0.195* 0.047 0.030
40 - 45 0.185* 0.051 0.029
45 - 50 0.071* 0.058 0.011
50 - 55 -0.031 0.070 -0.004
55 - 60 -0.146 0.094 -0.020
60 and over -0.602* 0.162 -0.069
Tenure (in quarters)
Tenure=2 0.576* 0.041 0.100
Tenure=3 1.098* 0.039 0.224
Tenure=4 1.605* 0.037 0.383
Tenure=5 1.866* 0.035 0.466
Tenure=6 1.766* 0.037 0.439
Tenure=7 1.710* 0.038 0.423
Tenure=8 2.124* 0.039 0.581
Tenure=9 0.714* 0.100 0.139
Tenure=10 0.719* 0.114 0.140
Tenure=11 1.131* 0.097 0.255
Tenure=12 0.366*** 0.221 0.062
Firm size (nr. of workers)
500-999 -0.007 0.025 -0.001
1000 and more -0.022 0.027 -0.003
Training costs per worker (log) 0.086* 0.005 0.013
Permanent workers’ pay -0.001* 0.000 -0.0001
Overtime hour cost 0.018* 0.003 0.003
No-overtime ﬁrm -0.128* 0.029 -0.018
Nr. of Fixed-term contracts 0.0002* 0.000 0.000
Fixed-term contracts residual -0.0001** 0.000 -0.0001
Intercept -3.120* 0.058
Industry dummies Yes
Nr. of observations 70,594
Log Likelihood -31,087.8
Table 4: Transitions from a Fixed-Term Contract to an Open-ended Contract -
Complementary Log-Log Model. *, **, *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10 percent,
respectively .
23of education is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero only for workers with 12 years of
schoolling or, especially, college education.
The conversion of ﬁxed-term contracts into open-ended contracts follows a clear
time pattern. The probability that such a conversion occurs starts at a very low
level but it increases very quickly after a 6-month period. Moreover, it has two
peaks - the ﬁrst at the ﬁfth quarter of duration of the contract and the second
at the eighth, that is, approximately when the contract reaches the end of its
ﬁrst and second year of duration. By the end of the third year of contract, the
probability that the worker will get promoted to a permanent position is below
its starting level. This is only partially coincident with the pattern reported by
G¨ uell and Petrongolo (2003). These authors ﬁnd that the conversion of temporary
contracts has a marked spike at their legal maximum duration, which is not what
we observe in the Portuguese case. While in Spain, promotion from a temporary
contract to a permanent position is attributed to the quit threat workers can exert
(which depends on their outside options), in Portugal the time-shape of the hazard
function hints at promotions being predominantly drivenby the employers’ staﬃng
strategy - promotions take place in speciﬁc moments of the temporary contract
life, not at its legal limit. However, as in Spain, diﬀerent types of workers face
diﬀerent outside options, and that also inﬂuences their promotion prospects. Age
and education emerge as the two most important determinants of the probability
of receiving an open-ended contract, which is consistent with what we know on
how labor market opportunities change over time and across workers.
Immigrant workers are signiﬁcantly less likely than natives to make a transition
from a temporary to an open-ended contract. For a predictedtransition probability
of 16 percent, the eﬀect of immigrant status is -4.5 percent.
Looking now at the employer side, we ﬁnd that ﬁrm-provided training has
a positive eﬀect on the probability of a temporary worker being promoted to a
permanent position - a 1 per cent increase in the amount of per capita training
costs increases the probability of promotion by 1.3 percent. In Section 4.1 we saw
that high-training employersare intensive users of ﬁxed-term contracts when hiring
24new employees. At that stage, we could not conclude why this was so, whether it
was because they were screening on-the-job workers that would be too costly to
dismiss if they hired them as permanent from the outset, or because they responded
to positive shocks, hiring a fringe of temporary workers that they would dismiss
as shocks were reversed. Here, we see that these ﬁrms are more likely to oﬀer
open-ended contracts to those workers that they hire with ﬁxed-term contracts.
This is an indication of temporary contracts being used for screening workers to
temporary positions by human capital intensive ﬁrms.
The importance of ﬁxed-term contracts as screening devices is further high-
lighted by the fact that the ﬁrm-level number of such contracts also has a positive,
albeit small, eﬀect on the probability of being promoted to a permanent position.
We would not anticipate a large eﬀect associated with the number of ﬁxed-term
contracts because, even if screening were the only reason that employers used
ﬁxed-term contracts, a non-trivial portion of these contracts would end with a
termination because they would be considered not-good-enough matches.
Other results indicate that workers who are hired as temporary by high-wage
employers (i.e. employers that pay higher unconditional wages to their permanent
employees) face poorer prospects of obtaining an open-ended contract from those
same employers. But those that are hired into organizations where the cost of
overtime work is higher are in the opposite situation. These results are a mani-
festation of the other uses ﬁxed-term contracts are given. Uncertainty and labor
costs attached to permanent workers/positions, although seemingly dominated by
screening, are also behind the recruitment of temporary workers.
5 Conclusion
This article studies the use that employers make of ﬁxed-term contracts and their
eﬀects on workers’ employment status and prospects. We consider two crucial mo-
ments of the (temporary) employment relationship: the hiring stage and the pro-
motion stage. We ﬁnd that the nexus between human capital variables - schooling,
skills and employer-provided training - and ﬁrm-level use of ﬁxed-term contracts
25is paramount at both stages.
At the hiring stage, we ﬁnd that human capital intensity and the ﬁrm-level
fraction of temporary contracts move in opposite directions. Still at this stage,
we also ﬁnd that the workers’ age has a decisive eﬀect on the type of contract
that they are oﬀered, the probability of receiving a temporary contract sharply
decreasing with age.
When we turn to the promotion stage, we ﬁnd that the proﬁle of employers
that make the most intense use of ﬁxed-term contracts matches the proﬁle of
those employers that oﬀer a permanent position to their temporary workers more
often.
There is also clear evidence indicating that both age and schooling are ma-
jor determinants of the outcome of temporary employment spells, older and less
educated workers being less likely to be oﬀered permanent contracts.
When a permanent position opens up, employers respond by oﬀering temporary
contracts to new-hires and, should that prove to be the right option, convert them
into open-ended contracts after a trial period. The length of the trial period varies
with the workers’ skills and education - it is shorter for more skilled and more
educated workers. Promotions to permanent positions are driven by employers’
staﬃng policies and are more likely to occur in the ﬁrst two years of contract, i.e.,
before its maximum duration is reached.
Despite the speciﬁc nature of the institutions governing the Portuguese labor
market, our results are remarkably consistent with previous research focusing on
the U.S. and some European countries, which conclude that temporary forms of
employment are used to screen workers for permanent positions, with on-the-job
training serving as an ability screen.
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